

on Group-Buying Behavior - Derived from Positive Participation

> 中山大學資管系 http://www.negogo.org 03/13/2009



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Presentation Agenda

NeGoGo Incentive Mechanism in Group-Buying

- Comparing the Performance of Group-Buying Models With Different Incentive Mechanisms
- Empirical Design of Incentive Mechanisms in Group-Buying Auctions: An Experimental Approach
- Incentive Mechanism and Perceived Fairness
 - Incentive mechanisms, fairness and participation in online group-buying auctions



What is Group-Buying?

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- To increase bargaining power in order to lower price by aggregating demand.
- Group-shopping, power-shopping, collective shopping, co-buying,...
- Initiator vs. participants
- Uncertainty
 - Aggregated demand
 - Price
 - Time
 - Success or not



Research Motivation

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- Growth of online group-buying
- Deadlock problem of group-buying
- Positive participation externality effects
 - existing orders -> new orders
- Price drop effect
 - Number of orders approaching to the quantity level of the next price tier => more new orders



=> Incentive mechanism to encourage buyers to join groupbuying earlier or to buy more



Research Purpose

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To explore if group-buying auction incentive mechanisms can effectively encourage participants to order more or order earlier, leading positive participation externality effect that ultimately increase sales for the seller and lower price for consumers.



Three Proposed Extra Incentive Mechanisms

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- Time-based
- Sequence-based
- Quantity-based
- => Encourage buyers to join earlier or to buy more



Research Framework



Order Size

Size of final order

Decision Time

• Difference b/w final order and planned order

Days for making decision

Price

Perceived value



H1: The Average Decision Time Hypothesis

Bidders in a group-buying auction involving the quantitybased incentive mechanism will have the longest average decision time in terms of an absolute measure of time.



H2: The Planned Order and Final Order Size Mean Difference Hypothesis

The mean difference between the planned order size and the final order size for auction participants will differ across the incentive mechanisms of the different group-buying models.



H 3: The Group-Buying Auction Participants' Perceived Value Hypothesis

Compared with group-buying models that offer no incentives, group-buying models with incentive mechanisms give higher perceived value to buyers.



Experimental Design - scenario

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- The subject is asked to play the role in charge of purchasing for a company
- The company currently needs 8 printers and will need another 15 printers in the coming half year.





Experimental Design – price curve

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Size of total orders	Unit price
1-50	6,000
51-100	5,800
101-200	5,400
201- 400	5,200
More than 400	5,000

@1實驗記	🚰 1 實驗說明 - Microsoft Internet Explorer					
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	☆價	格曲線表		
	交易日期	<u> 第:4/13-4/22正</u>		
	數量	價格		
	1-50	6000	-	
	51-100	5800		
	101-200	5400		
	201-400	5200		
	400以上	5000		
	產品介紹	召		
品質可靠、體積輕巧、價格 求。HP 已經連續 12 年蟬聯 信賴。	合理,新款 HP LaserJ 北美 PC World 雜誌的	et 1010 雷射印表機最前 'A+'品質肯定 — HP F	6符合您的商務需 的產品品質,您最能	

HP LaserJet 1015 雷射印表機的體積只有同等級機種的一半,因此在您的桌面還是書櫃等更 小的工作空間中都能輕鬆使用。



🕝 網際網

高品質列印效果

鮮銳、清晰的商務列印。 HP LaserJet 1015 雷射印表機採用 HP 解析度增強技術 (Ret), 在光學 600 x 600dpi 下即可提供最高達 1200 dpi 的有效解析度, 讓您獲得最優異的專業列印成果。

產品規格

ど 完成



Experimental Design - subject

- All subjects are part-time graduate students
- 10 days online experiment
- Valid samples

Buyer action Incentive groups	Join	Not join	Total	
Traditional	40	5	45	
Time-based	39	5	44	
Sequence-based	37	1	38	
Quantity-based	43	3	46	
Total	159	14	173	



Four Different Incentive Mechanisms in Group-Buying

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Traditional

No extra discount

Time-based

- April 13-15, 10% extra discount
- April 16-17, 5% extra discount

Sequence-based

- ◆ 1st 5th, 10% extra discount
- 6th − 15th, 5% extra discount

Quantity-based

- Order >12, 5% extra discount
- Order >20, 10% extra discount





梁價格曲線表

交易日期:4/13-4/22止







HP LaserJet 1015 雷射 印表機

產品市價: 6250元

現在馬上加入!錯過可 借!

數量	單價	目前累積購買量
1-50	6000	
51-100	5800	
101-200	5400	
201-400	5200	
401以上	5000	▶ 490
我要購買	下次再來	拒絕交易

現在的累積數量是490個,耶~~超過401了

產品名稱	A型印表機			
購買數量	個			
購買者	chris			
送貨地點	高雄市蓮海路70號			
E-mail	m934020014@student.nsysu.edu.tw			
	確認訂單 取消訂單			



(登出) (實驗說明) (角色扮演)

目前累積購買量

梁價格曲線表

交易日期: 4/13-4/22止

息早加入折扣息多喔!



LaserJet 1015 时印表機 品市價: 6250元 主馬上加入!錯 可惜! 凡4/13-4/15加入購買,額外享有九折優惠! 凡4/16-4/17加入購買,額外享有九五折優惠!

我要購買 下次再來

數量

1-50

51-100 101-200

201-400

401以上

單價

6000 5800

5400

5200

5000

拒絕交易

現在的累積數量是411個, 耶~~超過401了



^

產品名稱	A型印表機			
購買數量	個			
購買者	chris			
送貨地點	高雄市蓮海路70號			
E-mail	m934020014@student.nsysu.edu.tw			
	確認訂單 取消訂單			



(登出) (實驗說明) (角色扮演)

徐價格曲線表

🧏 息早加入折扣息多喔!

交易日期:4/13-4/22止

	數量 1-50	單價 6000	目前累積訂購量	目前累積購買人數		◆訂購單	
	51-100	5800					
	201-400	5200			<u></u> 座的石枘		
	401以上	5000	448	40	購買者	chris	
HP LaserJet 1015 雷 射印表機	日、台口	夕畦曾。	*, 额外宣右。	4.北原市1	送貨地點	高雄市蓮海路70號	
本日志庫・ 6060二	凡前6-	15名 購	冒者, 額外享	有九五折優惠!	E-mail m934020014@student.nsysu.edu.tw		
産命中損• 0230元						確認訂單 取消訂單	
現在馬上加入!錯		〔我要購	資 下次再來	拒絕交易			
地时间:	現	在的累積	數量是448個,耶~~	普遍401了			



☐ 豐出 〕 實驗說明 〕 角色扮演 〕
☆ 價格曲線表

交易日期:4/13-4/22止



HP LaserJet 1015 雷 射印表機

產品市價: 6250元 現在馬上加入!錯過 可惜!

數量	單價	目前累積購買量
1-50	6000	
51-100	5800	
101-200	5400	
201-400	5200	
401以上	5000	▶ 595

凡購買12台以上,額外享有九五折優惠! 凡購買20台以上,額外享有九折優惠!

我要購買 下次再來 拒絕交易

1111

現在的累積數量是595個, 那~~超過401了

產品名稱	A型印表機		
購買數量	個		
購買者	chris		
送貨地點	高雄市蓮海路70號		
E-mail	m934020014@student.nsysu.edu.tw		
	確認訂單 取消訂單		

📏 訂購單

🏷 買息多愈划算!

(1.4價格表 U 2.http://127.0.0.1:..)

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Basic Results of Experiment

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Quantity-based model got the largest order size

Model	Buyers join the group buying	Buyers not join the group buying	Size of total orders	Final price
Traditional	40	5	462	5000
Time-based	39	5	411	5200
Sequence-based	37	1	422	5000
Quantity-based	43	3	593	5000



Summary of Individual orders

Quantity-based model has more larger orders and largest average order size

Order size Model	< 12	12~19	≥ 20	Total buyers	Average order size
Traditional	30	3	7	40	11.55
Time-based	31	3	5	39	10.23
Sequence-based	25	5	7	37	11.41
Quantity-based	19	10	14	43	13.79



Summary of the Buyers' Joining Time

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Time-based model has more buyers joining earlier and has the shortest decision time

	Traditional		Time-based		Sequence- based		Quantity- based	
Day s	Buyers joining this day	Accu. buyers	Buyers joining this day	Accu. buyers	Buyers joining this day	Accu. buyers	Buyers joining this day	Accu. buyers
1 st	13	13	10	10	15	15	5	5
2 nd	3	16	8	18	2	17	4	9
3 rd	5	21	7	25	3	20	7	16
4 th	1	22	3	28	0	20	1	17
5 th	0	22	0	28	0	20	7	24
6 th ~ 10 th	18	40	11	39	17	37	19	43
	2.96 days		1.59 days		2.13 c	days	3.35 days	



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Hypothesis 1 - Decision Time

Bidders in a group-buying auction involving the quantitybased incentive mechanism will have the longest average decision time in terms of an absolute measure of time.

	Mean	Standard deviation	F-statistic
Traditional	2.956 (0.399)	3.618 (0.426)	
Time-based	1.591 (0.257)	2.499 (0.348)	2.854**
Sequence-based	2.132 (0.308)	2.924 (0.401)	(2.827**)
Quantity-based	3.348 (0.482)	3.308 (0.397)	

** significant at 0.05 level



Post Hoc Test: Decision Time

NeGoGo	Incentive (i)	Incentive (j)	Mean Difference	Significanc post hoc	Significance according to sever post hoc mean difference test	
М			(i-J)	Fisher (LSD)	Tamhane	Dunnett
l I	Traditional	Time	1.365	0.041**	0.224	0.220
S		Sequence	0.824	0.233	0.829	0.822
• NI		Quantity	-0.392	0.551	0.995	0.995
N S	Time	Traditional	-1.365	0.041**	0.224	0.220
Ý		Sequence	-0.541	0.436	0.940	0.937
S		Quantity	-1.757	0.008***	0.033**	0.032**
U	Sequence	Traditional	-0.824	0.233	0.829	0.822
		Time	0.541	0.436	0.940	0.937
ıl.		Quantity	-1.216	0.078*	0.384	0.378
	Quantity	Traditional	0.392	0.551	0.995	0.995
		Time	1.757	0.008**	0.033**	0.032**
		Sequence	1.216	0.078*	0.384	0.378



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Hypotheses 2 - Order Size

The mean difference between the planned order size and the final order size for auction participants will differ across the incentive mechanisms of the different group-buying models.

Treatments	Mean	Standard deviation	F-statistic	
Traditional	-2.267	8.603		
Time-based	-3.023	6.389	2 650**	
Sequence-based	-1.395	7.012	3.650^^	
Quantity-based	1.978	8.694		

* significant at 0.1 level



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Post Hoc Test: Difference of Discrepancy between Planned and Final Order Size

Incentive (<i>i</i>)	Incentive (<i>j</i>)	Mean Difference	n Significance According to Several <i>Post</i> ence <i>Hoc</i> Mean Difference Tests				
		(<i>i</i> - <i>j</i>)	Fisher (LSD)	Tamhane	Dunnett		
Traditional	Time	0.756	0.647	0.998	0.998		
	Sequence	-0.872	0.612	0.997	0.996		
	Quantity	-4.245	0.010***	0.122	0.121		
Time	Traditional	-0.756	0.647	0.998	0.998		
	Sequence	-1.628	0.346	0.859	0.852		
	Quantity	-5.001	0.003***	0.015**	0.015**		
Sequence	Traditional	0.872	0.612	0.997	0.996		
	Time	1.628	0.346	0.859	0.852		
	Quantity	-3.373	0.050**	0.276	0.272		
Quantity	Traditional	4.245	0.010***	0.122	0.121		
	Time	5.001	0.003***	0.015**	0.015**		
	Sequence	3.373	0.050**	0.276	0.272		



Hypotheses 3 - Perceived Value

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 Compared with group-buying models that offer no incentives, group-buying models with incentive mechanisms give higher perceived value to buyers.

Treatments	Mean	Standard deviation	F-statistic	
Traditional	-22.22	358.589		
Time-based	274.55	464.715	F 700***	
Sequence-based	151.32	366.570	5.798^^^	
Quantity-based	318.48	486.561		

*** significant at 0.01 level



Post Hoc Test: Perceived Value Difference

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Incentive (<i>i</i>)	Incentive (<i>j</i>)	Mean Difference	MeanSignificance According to Several PostfferenceHoc Mean Difference Tests				
		(<i>i</i> - <i>j</i>)	Fisher (LSD)	Tamhane	Dunnett		
Traditional	Time	-296.768	0.001***	0.007***	0.007***		
	Sequence	-173.538	0.066*	0.182	0.180		
	Quantity	-340.700	0.000***	0.002***	0.002***		
Time	Traditional	296.768	0.001***	0.007***	0.007***		
	Sequence	123.230	0.193	0.704	0.696		
	Quantity	-43.933	0.625	0.999	0.998		
Sequence	Traditional	173.538	0.066*	0.182	0.180		
	Time	-123.230	0.193	0.704	0.696		
	Quantity	-167.162	0.075*	0.380	0.374		
Quantity	Traditional	340.701	0.000***	0.002***	0.002***		
	Time	43.933	0.625	0.999	0.998		
	Sequence	167.163	0.075*	0.380	0.374		



Conclusions

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Almost every incentive mechanism has resulted in the expected result:

- Order more or order earlier
- Perceive higher value

However, it didn't lead positive participation externality effect.



Accumulated Buyers and Orders

	Traditional		Time-based		Sequence- based		Quantity-based	
Day No.	Accu. Buyers	Accu. Orders	Accu. Buyers	Accu. Orders	Accu. Buyers	Accu. Orders	Accu. Buyers	Accu. Orders
1	14	109	9	98	16	146	5	38
2	19	158	17	168	19	194	12	129
3	24	217	24	233	22	211	16	189
4	24	217	27	260	22	211	22	276
5	25	227	27	260	22	211	25	308
6	26	250	29	271	23	219	27	333
7	27	260	29	271	29	287	30	364

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Why not cause positive participation externality effect???





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Presentation Agenda

NeGoGo Incentive Mechanism in Group-Buying

- Comparing the Performance of Group-Buying Models With Different Incentive Mechanisms
- Empirical Design of Incentive Mechanisms in Group-Buying Auctions: An Experimental Approach
- Incentive Mechanism and Perceived Fairness
 - Incentive mechanisms, fairness and participation in online group-buying auctions



Research Model

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Hypothesis 1 The Price Discount and Price Fairness Hypothesis

Whether consumers have access to extra price discounts will affect their perceptions of price fairness. The more price discounts to which they have access, the higher will be their perceived price fairness.



Hypothesis 2 The Incentive Mechanisms and Procedural Fairness Hypotheses

Consumers who experience different incentive mechanisms will perceive different levels of procedural fairness. The strength sequence of perceived procedural fairness will be quantity-based, then time-based, and finally sequence-based.



Hypothesis 3

The Perceived Fairness-Price Satisfaction Link

Consumer perceptions of fairness will have a positive effect on their price satisfaction.

- Hypothesis 3a (The Procedural Fairness-Price Satisfaction Link Hypothesis). The higher procedural fairness that consumers perceive, the higher price satisfaction they will have.
- Hypothesis 3b (The Price Fairness Hypothesis-Price Satisfaction Link Hypothesis). The higher price fairness that consumers perceive, the higher price satisfaction they will have.



Hypothesis 4

The Perceived Fairness-Intention to Purchase Link Hypothesis

Consumer perceptions of fairness will have a positive effect on intention to purchase.

- Hypothesis 4a (The Perceived Procedural Fairness-Intention to Purchase Link). The higher procedural fairness that consumers perceive, the higher intention to purchase they will have.
- Hypothesis 4b (The Perceived Price Fairness-Intention to Purchase Link Hypothesis). The higher price fairness that consumers perceive, the higher intention to purchase they will have.



Hypothesis 5

The Price Satisfaction-Intention to Purchase Hypothesis

The higher the price satisfaction that a consumer has, the higher will be his or her intention to purchase.



Hypothesis 6 The Purchase Intention Hypothesis

The higher intention to purchase consumers have, the higher the probability of realizing the purchase behavior they will have.



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Experimental Scenario

你是中山大學的學生,為了促進同學聯誼交流,趁著期中考剛結束, 班上準備籌辦聚餐晚會活動,你負責晚會籌畫與採購獎品部份。你已經大 致決定好晚會的各項獎品,但還剩有2000元的預算,打算用來購買約120 元左右的普獎16份。你正在傷腦筋要買何種獎品時,聽到同學說起白師傅 捲心酥相當可口、好吃,因此你覺得白師傅捲心酥或許是可以考慮的普獎 之一。

從網站上得知,每罐捲心酥定價為130元,且若購買數量少於30罐時,需要付額外運費150元。很巧地是,你發現學校美食社正在發起白師 傳捲心酥的團購活動,如果團購的累積數量高於30罐時,可以免運費;同時,如果累積更多的數量,還可能用更低的價格買到白師傳捲心酥。

因此你決定把白師傳捲心酥當做普獎的可能選擇之一。如果價格合理 的話,可以購買數罐當成一部份普獎,不足部份再繼續尋找其他適當的產 品。如果價格很便宜的話,就可能購買更多罐當成普獎,甚至你也考慮自 掏腰包多買幾罐當做平時的零食。



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Experiment Product

NeGoGo ■ 白師傅捲心酥(虛擬產品,模仿黑師傅捲心酥)

- ◆ 經濟能力許可範圍
- ◆ 有興趣的產品

好吃捲心酥,大家一起買!

說到「白師傅捲心酥」可能很難想像它到底是什麼,簡單說來就是像「脆笛酥」 一樣細細長長的,裡頭捲了各式口味的內餡。其實它之所以這麼受歡迎,原因無它 - 用料實在、口感奇佳,再加上不會太過甜膩,讓人忍不住就會一根接一根,如果 一邊看電視一邊抱著白師傅,一不小心真的會一口氣就吃掉大半罐!所以,還在等 什麼?趕快一起加入團購,享受這個人間美味吧!







Experimental Price Curve

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Price Level	Accumulated Orders	Price
1	1 - 30	NT\$130
2	31 - 60	NT\$125
3	61 – 180	NT\$120
4	181 – 360	NT\$115
5	361 and higher	NT\$110





Three Incentive Mechanisms

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Time-based

- June 5-7, 10% extra discount
- June 8-9, 5% extra discount

Sequence-based

- 1st 5th, 10% extra discount
- ♦ 6th 15th, 5% extra discount

Quantity-based

- Order 10-15, 5% extra discount
- Order >15, 10% extra discount



Experimental Design

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ncentive	10% extra discount			5% extra discount			No extra discount		
nechanism	Buyer No.	Accu. Q	Day No.	Buyer No.	Accu. Q	Day No.	Buyer No.	Accu. Q	Day No.
Fime-based	5	61	2	10	112	4	15	153	6
Sequence- based	5	61	2	10	112	4	15	153	6
Quantity- based	5	61	2	10	112	4	15	153	6





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H1: Effect of Incentive Discounts on Perceived Price Fairness

More discounts

-> Higher perceived price fairness

Test	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Squared Error	F-Value	<i>p</i> -Value
Between groups	17.495	2	8.748	6.174	0.002***
Within groups	413.727	292	1.417		
Total	431.222	294			





Post Hoc Test of Effects of Incentive Discounts on Perceived Price Fairness

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Final Price Discounts (i)	Final Price Discounts (j)	Mean Difference (i-j)	Std. Error	<i>P</i> -Value
10% off	5% off	0.068	0.171	0.925
	No discount	0.542	0.168	0.006***
5% off	10% off	-0.068	0.171	0.925
	No discount	0.474	0.170	0.021**
No discount	10% off	-0.542	0.168	0.006***
	5% off	-0.474	0.170	0.021**



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H2: Effect of Incentive Mechanisms on Perceived Procedural Fairness

Quantity-based > Time-based > Sequence-based

Test	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Squared Error	F-Value	<i>p</i> -Value
Between groups	6.48	2	3.24	3.198	0.042***
Within groups	295.62	292	1.01		
Total	302.09	294			





Post Hoc Test of Effects of Incentive Mechanisms on Perceived Procedural Fairness

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Incentive Mechanism (i)	Incentive Mechanism (j)	Mean Difference (i-j)	Std. Error	<i>P</i> -Value
0	Time	-0.249	0.144	0.227
Sequence	Quantity	-0.350**	0.142	0.050**
Time	Sequence	0.249	0.144	0.227
TIME	Quantity	-0.101	0.144	0.782
	Sequence	0.350**	0.142	0.050**
Quantity	Time	0.101	0.144	0.782



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Path Estimation Results

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Path	<i>t</i> -Statistic	Estimate	R ²
$ProcFairness \rightarrow PriceSatisf$	2.19	0.11 ^{**x}	12.6%
$ProcFairness \rightarrow ParticIntent$	5.22	0.37***	17.8%
$PriceFairness \rightarrow PriceSatisf$	12.12	0.73***	23.0%
PriceFairness \rightarrow ParticIntent	3.29	0.32***	13.5%
$PriceSatisf \rightarrow ParticIntent$	0.14	0.01 ^{xxx}	16.3%





Summary of Hypotheses Tests





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